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WEISSMANN V. FREEMAN: THE SECOND
CIRCUIT ERRS IN ITS ANALYSIS OF
DERIVATIVE WORKS BY JOINT
AUTHORS
When one hears the mellifluous strains of "Melancholy Baby"
it is easy to overlook the fact that the lyricist and composer
worked independently.' Nevertheless, each is considered a joint au-
thor of the work 2 and has an undivided ownership interest in the
copyright of the finished product,3 subject to a duty to account to
See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406, 407-08 (2d Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 820 (1947).
2 See id. at 409. The Shapiro court stated, "[w]e think they were [coauthors]. The
words and music of a song constitute a 'musical composition' in which the two contributions
merge into a single work to be performed as a unit for the pleasure of the hearers; they are
not a 'composite' work, like the articles in an encyclopedia." Id.
The Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Act") defined a joint work as a "work prepared by two
or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Joint authors need not
know each other, provided that they intend that their contributions eventually merge into a
single work. See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267
(2d Cir. 1944); Donna v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 374 F. Supp. 429, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). One
commentator has suggested that "[tihe essence of joint authorship is a joint laboring in
furtherance of a preconcerted common design," a definition allowing for the joint authors to
toil separately, provided they are acting pursuant to a collaboration agreement. See 1 M.
NIMMER, NIMbER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.03 (1988).
' See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C. Ci.),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988); Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640,
645 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972); M.
NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 6.03; Cary, Joint Ownership of Copyrights, in STUDIES ON COPY-
RIGHT 703 (1963). The Act provides: "Copyright in a work protected under this title vests
initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of
the copyright in the work." 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982).
While joint authors are joint owners, joint owners are not necessarily joint authors. See
M. NIMNER, supra note 2, at § 6.01. Joint ownership results when: a) a writer grants part of
his copyright to another person; b) a copyright passes from a sole author to more than one
person, through sale, inheritance, or bifurcated renewal rights; or c) when the sole author
lives in a community property state. See id.; see also Note, Accountability Among Co-Own-
ers of Statutory Copyright, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1550, 1551-53 (1959) (discussing various ori-
gins of co-ownership of copyright). For a further discussion of the effect of community prop-
erty laws on copyright ownership, see M. NIMMiER, supra note 2, at § 6.13. See generally
Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 UCLA L.
REv. 383 (1988) (discussing relationship between copyright and community property law).
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the other author for half the profits.4 Among the most important
ownership rights is the right to prepare a derivative work based on
the underlying joint composition.5 The derivative work itself may
be copyrighted, but the copyright extends only to those aspects
which are original to the derivative work. Courts are divided as to
the level of originality required for such a copyright, holding the
derivative work to either a "minimal" or a "substantial"' level of
' A joint author must account to his coauthor for any profits resulting from the use or
license of the work. See Community for Creative Non-Violence, 846 F.2d at 1498; Oddo v.
Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1984); Cary, supra note 3, at 697; Note, supra note 3, at
1559; see also Comment, Problems in Co-Ownership of Copyrights, 8 UCLA L. REv. 1035,
1040-44 (1961) (describing theories supporting accountability process). But see Jerry Vogel
Music Co. v. Miller Music, Inc., 272 App. Div. 571, 574, 74 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (1st Dep't
1947) (dictum that joint authors must share in proceeds from licensing but not from use of
joint work), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 782, 87 N.E.2d 681 (1949).
In the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, joint authors must share
equally in the proceeds from a joint work despite the fact that one author contributed more
than the other. See Sweet Music, Inc. v. Melrose Music Corp., 189 F. Supp. 655, 659 (S.D.
Cal. 1960); Eliscu v. T.B. Harms Co., 151 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 603, 604 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1966).
' See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). The Act states, "[s]ubject to sections 107 through 118, the
owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive right . . . to prepare [or authorize
preparation of] derivative works based upon the copyrighted work." Id.; see also Weinstein
v. University of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1095 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Each coowner of a copyright may
revise the work (that is, make a derivative work) and publish the original or the revision");
Ellingson, The Copyright Exception for Derivative Works and the Scope of Utilization, 56
IND. L.J. 1, 4 (1980) (copyright owner must consent to use of work in derivative work).
A derivative work is defined as:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound re-
cording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revi-
sions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, rep-
resent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
' See Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 813
(7th Cir. 1942); Dorsey v. Old Sur. Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 873 (10th Cir. 1938); Dynamic
Solutions, Inc. v. Planning & Control, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1329, 1340 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); M.
NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 3.04; Hemnes, The Adaptation of Copyright Law to Video
Games, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 171, 181 (1982).
The Act provides that the "copyright in a . . . derivative work extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting ma-
terial employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting mate-
rial." 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982).
' See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951).
Catalda is the leading case in the area of minimal originality, and many courts have quoted
its holding that "[a]ll that is needed ... is that the 'author' contributed something more
than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recognizably 'his own.'" Id.; see, e.g., M. Kramer
Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 438 (4th Cir. 1986); Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moul-
trie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); see also Gelles-
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originality. Recently, in Weissmann v. Freeman,9 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that copyright
protection extended to a derivative work with a minimal degree of
originality, even though the underlying work was the product of an
Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143, 146-47 (7th Cir.) (originality means little
more than prohibition against actual copying), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963).
The Second Circuit may be moving toward adopting more than a minimal originality
standard. See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (require-
ment of substantial variation is inherent in concept of originality), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857
(1976). The dissent in Batlin argued that the court erred in holding an author to a substan-
tial variation standard, and added that courts "should require only minimal variations to
find copyrightability." Id. at 492 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, Batlin is often cited
in support of a minimal variation standard since that opinion cited the Catalda case with
approval. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d
663, 668 (7th Cir. 1986) (construing Batlin as requiring minimal amount of creativity), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987); Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Winterbrook Corp., 554 F. Supp.
1309, 1317 (D.N.H. 1982) (reading Batlin as requiring a low threshold of originality); Follett
v. New Am. Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (quoting Batlin as support-
ing Catalda standard); Dollcraft Indus. Ltd. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Co., 479 F. Supp. 1105,
1114 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (reading Batlin as requiring a low threshold of creativity). Some com-
mentators believe that Catalda is still the proper approach. See, e.g., M. NIMMER, supra
note 2, at § 3.03 (quoting Catalda and stating proper standard is one of "distinguishable
variation"); Page, The Works: Distinguishing Derivative Creations Under Copyright, 5
CARDozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 415, 421 (1986) (stating Catalda approach is generally correct).
' See Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Fla., Inc., 753 F.2d 1565, 1568 (11th Cir. 1985)
("It is well settled that in order to qualify for a separate copyright, the derivative work must
contain some substantial, and not merely trivial, originality"); Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V.
Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1970) (variation must be "substantial" and
"meaningful"), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); Adventures in Good Eating, 131 F.2d at
813 (editor may obtain derivative copyrights if he materially revises work); M.M. Business
Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 419, 425 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (opting for substantial
variation test), aff'd, 472 F.2d 1137 (6th Cir. 1973); Norden v. Oliver Ditson Co., 13 F. Supp.
415, 417 (D. Mass. 1936) (musical composition must be "substantially a new and original
work" to be copyrightable). Some commentators have read Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698
F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.), as requiring a substantial degree of originality to copy-
right a derivative work. See Brown, The Widening Gyre: Are Derivative Works Getting Out
of Hand?, 3 CAnDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (1984); Francione, Facing The Nation: The
Standards for Copyright Infringement, and Fair Use of Factual Works, 134 U. PA. L. REv.
519, 539 n.111 (1986).
The Act mentions originality but does not state which standard of originality is to be
applied. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The House Report observed:
The phrase "original works of authorship," which is purposely left undefined, is
intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by
the courts under the present copyright statute. This standard does not include
requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to
enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976).; see Toro Co. v. R & R Prod. Co., 787
F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (common law standard of originality unchanged by Act);
Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 n.7 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating House
Report left Batlin standard undisturbed).
9 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989).
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ongoing collaborative effort between joint authors, one of whom
penned the derivative work. 10 Moreover, the Weissmann court
held that where the derivative work determination is based solely
on documentary evidence, any evidence of the author's credibility
is "scarcely pertinent" and irrelevant.11
In Weissmann, Drs. Freeman and Weissmann worked together
closely in the field of radionuclide imaging, which involved re-
search on radiopharmaceutical, iminodiacetic acid ("IDA"), a sub-
stance used to assist in the diagnosis of certain liver and biliary
diseases.1" Their professional relationship began in the late 1970's
when Dr. Freeman began developing a patient data base for IDA
analogs.'3 Dr. Weissmann, then a fourth-year resident, worked
under Dr. Freeman's tutelage on the project, and beginning in
1979, the two coauthored many articles in the field of IDA deriva-
tives.14 In 1980, the two doctors coauthored a syllabus which was to
accompany lectures for refresher courses on IDA imaging.15 The
parties jointly updated the syllabus on a yearly basis from 1980 to
1985.16 In 1985, Dr. Weissmann authored an article entitled
"Hepatobiliary Imaging" ("P-i"), which was admittedly based on
previous papers jointly written by the parties. 7 Dr. Weissmann
thwarted Dr. Freeman's attempt to use P-1 at a review course in
1987, and later filed suit, claiming that Dr. Freeman had infringed
her copyright in P-1.8
10 See id. at 1321-22.
11 Id. at 1322.
'2 Id. at 1315-16.
13 Id. Dr. Freeman's reputation in the field of nuclear medicine made FDA approval
possible for the IDA research. See Weissmann v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248, 1253
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989). Dr. Freeman was
ultimately responsible for all the work done with the patients. Id. In Dr. Weissmann's
words, "the buck stop[ped]" with Dr. Freeman. Id.
"I Weismann, 868 F.2d at 1315. Dr. Weissmann admitted that there was "no peer-re-
viewed paper or abstract" on her curriculum vitae other than those coauthored by Dr. Free-
man. Weissmann, 684 F. Supp. at 1254.
11 Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1315. The trial court defined a syllabus as "a review paper
providing an overview of the potential and of the current state of the art of specific research
being done in the particular field." Weissmann, 684 F. Supp. at 1254.
"5 Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1316.
1, Id. P-1 was originally included in a book prepared by the Radiological Society of
North America ("RSNA"), which listed Dr. Weissmann as the sole author of the article. Id.
RSNA later copyrighted the book which contained the article. Id.
's Id. Although Dr. Freeman proceeded with his lecture without the aid of P-i, Dr.
Weissmann sought a permanent injunction asking for actual damages and profits, a prohibi-
tion against Dr. Freeman's use of P-I, and a declaration that Dr. Freeman had infringed her
copyright. Id.
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After examining the credibility of the parties, Judge Pollack of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed Dr. Weissmann's claims, holding that Dr. Freeman
was a coauthor of P-1 and was therefore entitled to the same copy-
right privileges as Dr. Weissmann."e
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding
that Dr. Freeman was not a joint author of P-i, and that Dr.
Weissmann was the sole owner of a derivative copyright in the new
material in P-1.20 Writing for the court, Judge Cardamone posited
that in order for a derivative work to be a joint work, each author
must have intended to contribute to a joint work at the time of his
or her contribution.2 Therefore, the fact that P-1 had only Dr.
Weissmann's name on it was held to be prima facie proof of her
intention to make P-1 an individual derivative work and not a fur-
ther joint work.22 Judge Cardamone also reasoned that since Dr.
Freeman did not contribute to P-i, he could not have been a joint
author of it. 23 Judge Cardamone concluded that the district court's
finding of coauthorship based on Dr. Freeman's contributions to
the preexisting works was clearly erroneous. 24 After dismissing the
district court's findings on witness credibility as immaterial to the
issue of P-l's originality,25 the court examined P-1 for the level of
originality required of a derivative work copyright.26 Adhering to
precedent indicating that only a minimal standard of originality
19 Weissmann, 684 F. Supp. at 1260. Judge Pollack further noted that even if Dr. Free-
man had not been a joint author, his use of P-1 was a "fair use" of the article which did not
result in copyright infringement. Id. at 1261.
20 See Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1327. The Weissmann court also held that Dr. Free-
man's use of P-1 did not fall within the "fair use" exception to copyright infringement. Id.
at 1326.
21 See id. at 1318. Judge Cardamone initially found that since Dr. Freeman did not
contribute to P-i, he could not be a coauthor. Id. The court stated: "Yet, there is no evi-
dence that they intended their joint product to be forever indivisible like the finite whole of
the completed single song .... The facts point to a contrary conclusion." Id. at 1319.
22 See id. at 1320. Judge Cardamone apparently ignored the trial court's finding that
there was "a practice that, rather than designating the authorship, the by-line name appear-
ing on such review course material was utilized as an identification of the reviewer or lec-
turer who was to appear before the audience." Weissmann, 684 F. Supp. at 1255.
2 Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1318.
2, See id. at 1320.
21 See id. at 1322. The court asserted that credibility was "scarcely pertinent to deter-
mining whether the newly-added matter satisfies the statutory requirements for pro-
tectability... [and] the trial judge cannot insulate his findings on originality from appellate
review by calling them credibility determinations." Id.
2 See id.
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was necessary, 27 Judge Cardamone concluded that the new mate-
rial28 satisfied this standard and was therefore entitled to copyright
protection.2 9
Although concurring in the decision, Judge Pierce rejected the
reasoning underlying Judge Cardamone's conclusion that Dr. Free-
man was not a joint author of P-1. 0 Judge Pierce contended that a
joint author need not contribute to "each incremental addition to
the work."3' 1 Therefore, had Dr. Weissmann intended the work to
be joint, Judge Pierce would have found Dr. Freeman to be a joint
author based on his contribution to the preexisting work.32 Judge
Pierce would also have considered Dr. Weissmann's incorporation
of Dr. Freeman's "false positives" study3 into P-1 as evidence of
Dr. Weissmann's intent to write a joint work when she wrote P-1. 4
Judge Pierce concluded, however, that Dr. Freeman did not pre-
sent enough aggregate evidence to show that Dr. Weissmann's in-
tent was to create a joint work. 5
Judge Lumbard dissented "for the reasons stated in Judge
Pollack's thorough and reasoned opinion" in the district court. 6
27 See id. at 1321.
2 The court stated that the new material added by Dr. Weissmann included:
(1) a selection and arrangement of photo illustrations and associated captions; (2)
references to recent reports in the pertinent literature; (3) selection, condensation,
and description of additional source material; (4) several new textual additions;
(5) substantial rearrangement of the manner and order of presentation of material
contained in the parties' prior joint works; and (6) the addition of a section on
"congenital disorders," a revised treatment of "chronic cholecystitis," and the in-
corporation of Dr. Freeman's "false positive" studies.
Id. at 1322. The district court found that "only four new references were added," and that
"[o]nly trivial variations were stated in P-1, adding nothing." Weissmann v. Freeman, 684 F.
Supp. 1248, 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd in part, afl'd in part, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989).
2 See Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1323.
30 See id. at 1327 (Pierce, J., concurring).
31 Id. (Pierce, J., concurring).
2 See id. (Pierce, J., concurring). Judge Pierce reasoned that Dr. Freeman's lack of
contribution to P-1 would have been immaterial if Dr. Weissmann's intent had been to write
a joint work. See id. (Pierce, J., concurring).
13 See id. at 1328 (Pierce, J., concurring). Dr. Freeman wrote an article in 1983 on re-
ported erroneous results reached using IDA imaging. See Weissmann v. Freeman, 684 F.
Supp. 1248, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd in part, affd in part, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989).
The article was included verbatim in P-1. Id.
24 See Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1328 (Pierce, J., concurring). Judge Pierce argued that
"the parties' past willingness to have their works absorbed into the syllabus was relevant to
the question of the appellant's intent when she reshaped the syllabus into P-I." Id. (Pierce,
J., concurring).
See id. (Pierce, J., concurring).
28 Id. (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
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It is submitted that the Weissmann court properly recognized
that to forbid an author from writing a derivative work based upon
his own jointly authored original text would make each coauthor a
permanent partner of his one-time collaborator. However, because
the intent of the derivative author at the time of writing deter-
mines whether the work is joint, it is suggested that his credibility
is in fact a dispositive factor since his intent will be placed in issue
if his coauthor alleges that the new work was created pursuant to
an agreement that it would be considered a joint effort. It is fur-
ther submitted that the proper standard of originality should be a
test of substantial originality inasmuch as a lower standard will
impede the other joint author's right to produce a derivative work
based on the underlying joint work. This Comment will examine
the role of a putative derivative author's credibility in an infringe-
ment action against his former coauthor, and propose a standard of
originality which would be appropriate in such actions.
EVIDENCE OF THE AUTHOR'S CREDIBILITY
The Weissmann court stated that the author's intention at the
time of writing is determinative as to whether the work is joint or
individual.3 7 Since a joint author may work independently of his
coauthor,38 pursuant to an implied agreement to eventually merge
the works,39 his intention at the time he undertakes to write the
putative derivative work will determine whether or not the work is
a further joint work or a copyrightable individual derivative
work.40 It is suggested that the Weissmann court should have con-
"' See id. at 1319. The focus is on the author's intent at the time of writing, and not at
some later date. See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266,
267 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J.); Eckert v. Hurley Chicago Co., 638 F. Supp. 699, 702 (N.D.
Ill. 1986); M. NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 6.03.
See Edward B. Marks, 140 F.2d at 267; Eckert, 638 F. Supp. at 702.
" See Ferrer v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236, 237 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1966) (joint author need not have express collaboration agreement with
coauthor).
10 See H.R. REP. No. 1476, surpa note 8, at 120. The report stated "[t]he touchstone
here is the intention, at the time the writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or com-
bined into an integrated unit." Id. In the instant case, the circuit court found that the dis-
trict court had made no express finding regarding Dr. Weissmann's intent. Weissmann, 868
F.2d at 1319. However, the district court stated that P-1 was "a 1985 update of a continually
evolving stock piece." Weissmann v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (S.D.N.Y. 1988),
rev'd in part, afl'd in part, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989). The district court also stated that
"[tihe parties had agreed, at least impliedly if not overtly, that the stock piece could be used
as a handout by either of them." Weissmann, 684 F. Supp. at 1255-56. It is suggested that
1989]
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sidered evidence concerning Dr. Weissmann's credibility. To this
end, it bears noting that Dr. Weissmann did not file for a certifi-
cate of copyright until two years after she wrote the putative deriv-
ative work.41
When an unrelated party applies for a copyright on a work
based on prior author's efforts, the work by definition will be de-
rivative because the prior author could not have intended the work
to be joint; the requisite intent that the works be eventually
merged would have been lacking when the original work was writ-
ten.42 However, when the preexisting work is coauthored pursuant
to an implied agreement to merge the authors' works at a subse-
quent date, it is submitted that the intent of one of the authors to
write a derivative work should be a triable issue of fact if the coau-
thor claims the new work is actually a joint work.43 Thus, the cred-
ibility of a joint author claiming derivative status for the new work
should play a role in the court's determination of that author's in-
tent.44 Accordingly, it is submitted that Dr. Weissmann's credibil-
in finding an implied agreement to make P-1 a joint effort, the district court implicitly
found Dr. Weissmann's intent was to contribute to a joint effort when she wrote P-1. If such
a finding was warranted, then Judge Pierce would have found them to be joint authors of
the work. See Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1327 (Pierce, J., concurring) (each joint author need
not contribute to each incremental step if intent is to write a joint work).
"' See Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1316. It is submitted that had Dr. Weissmann filed for a
certificate for P-1 immediately after she completed it, this would have evinced an intent to
have written an individual derivative work. However, Dr. Weissmann did not file for the
certificate until two years after the work was completed, id., and her intention when she
wrote the work is dispositive in this case. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
42 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). If the underlying work is copyrightable, the new author
and the prior author could not have the requisite statutory intention "that their contribu-
tions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." Id. The new
work, since it is based on "one or more preexisting works," can be a derivative work only if
it represents "an original work of authorship." Id.
4" In the instant case, the gravamen of Dr. Freeman's defense to the infringement claim
was that the work was joint, which would have made him immune from an infringement
suit. See Donna v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 374 F. Supp. 429, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (neither au-
thor nor illustrator of children's books could be held liable to other for copyright infringe-
ment as each owned an undivided interest in whole); M. NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 6.03.
" See Weissmann, 684 F. Supp. at 1258. Since the touchstone is the intention at the
time the writing is done, it is submitted that the court should have considered the credibil-
ity of the authors along with the documentary evidence. If the author's credibility is consid-
ered a factor in determining whether the work is derivative or joint, an appellate court could
not conduct a de novo review of the trial court's finding. See Apex Oil Co. v. Vanguard Oil
& Serv. Co., 760 F.2d 417, 424 (2d Cir. 1985) (Oakes, J., concurring); Novelty Textile Mills,
Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977). Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 52(a) states, "[flindings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). In the
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ity should have been considered by the court as a factor bearing on
her intent to write a joint or derivative work.45
A. SUBSTANTIAL LEVEL OF ORIGINALITY AS THE STANDARD FOR DE-
RIVATIVE WORKS BY A JOINT AUTHOR
Assuming a former joint author passes the first hurdle by dis-
proving his coauthor's allegation of an intention to write a joint
work, the court still must determine whether the work is suffi-
ciently original to warrant copyright protection as a derivative
work.46 The Weissmann court applied the minimal level of origi-
nality test to determine whether the derivative work should be af-
forded copyright protection.47 It is proposed that under the facts of
this case the court should have created an exception to its usual
standard48 and applied the substantial originality test. When a
work is being revised on a regular basis, each revision has a meas-
ure of originality since it naturally contains some new material.49
While the revision may have been done in the ordinary course of
business pursuant to an agreement to work jointly on the piece,
instant case, Dr. Weissmann's demeanor was a factor considered by the trial court in reach-
ing its decision. Weissmann, 684 F. Supp. at 1258. Since "[t]he demeanor of a witness is
always assumed to be in evidence," The William J. Riddle, 102 F. Supp. 884, 887 (S.D.N.Y.
1952), affd sub nom. United States v. United States Lines Co., 200 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1952),
it is submitted that the court properly considered Dr. Weissmann's demeanor on the stand.
See 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 946 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
"I The trial court found that the instant case was brought for personal reasons by Dr.
Weissmann. Weissmann, 684 F. Supp. at 1258. The court could properly consider this as a
factor affecting Dr. Weissmann's credibility as a witness. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 40 (3d ed. 1984) ("Partiality, or any acts, relationships or motives reasonably
likely to produce it, may be proved to impeach credibility"). Furthermore, Dr. Weissmann
had a sexual discrimination suit pending against the hospital at the time she instigated the
litigation in this case. See Brief for Appellee at 2, Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d
Cir. 1989) (Nos. 88-7435, 88-7465). Pending suits may also be considered by the court in
assessing witness credibility. See E. CLEARY, supra, at § 40; see also State v. Michelski, 66
N.D. 760, 772, 268 N.W. 713, 717 (1936) (pending civil suit against defendant may impeach
witness in criminal action); Blake v. State, 365 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963)
(same). It is suggested that such factors should also be considered by the court to aid in
ascertaining Dr. Weissmann's intent to write a derivative or joint work.
" See Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1321.
47 See id. The court stated that "only an unmistakable dash of originality need be
demonstrated," id., and cited Catalda to support the proposition. See supra note 7 (discus-
sion of Catalda and its progeny).
48 See supra note 7.
41 See Weissmann, 684 F. Supp. at 1257. Despite the fact that "most of everything that
has had to be done with this agent [IDA] has become established," the district court still
found that four references were added. Id. It is suggested that any revision contains some-
thing new or original, otherwise there would have been no need to revise the work.
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holding a derivative copyright claimant to only a minimal level of
originality would enable a joint author to claim, post hoc, that the
revision was actually a copyrightable derivative work. 0
However, as the Weissmann court properly recognized, joint
authors should not be deemed inseparable partners because a joint
author may prefer to write a derivative work independently of his
former coauthor and copyright its original aspects." It is suggested
that the standard of substantial originality is the appropriate copy-
right test since it would properly enable the joint author to escape
the shackles of his prior collaborative effort,5 2 and facilitate the
court's role in separating legitimate derivative works from ordinary
updates pursuant to a joint authorship agreement.
THE MINIMAL STANDARD IMPEDES A JOINT AUTHOR'S RIGHT TO
REVISE THE WORK
It is well established that where two authors write identical
works, each work is copyrightable if it is the product of original
authorship.53 An author of the underlying work who has not yet
1o See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (revisions may constitute a derivative work). The copy-
right would extend only to those elements of the derivative work that are original. Id.; see
Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 992 (1971); Ellingson, The Copyright Exception for Derivative Works and the
Scope of Utilization, 56 IND. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1980); Page, The Works: Distinguishing Derivative
Creations Under Copyright, 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 415, 416 (1986).
" See Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1319. The Weissmann court stated that § 103(b) of the
Act gives the author a right to copyright a derivative work as a way of protecting derivative
ideas. Id.
52 See infra note 60.
13 See Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 n.3 (2d Cir.
1977); Donald v. Uarco Business Forms, 478 F.2d 764, 766 (8th Cir. 1973); M.M. Business
Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc., 472 F.2d 1137, 1139 n.5 (6th Cir. 1973); Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951); Merritt Forbes & Co. v. Newman
Inv. Sec., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 943, 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Winter-
brook Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1309, 1317 (D.N.H. 1982); Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Etone Int'l
Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 414, 414 (D.N.J. 1980); Professional Sys. & Supplies, Inc. v.
Databank Supplies & Equip. Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 693, 696 (W.D. Olda. 1979); R. Dakin
& Co. v. Charles Offset Co., 441 F. Supp. 434, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); M. NIMmER, supra note
2, at § 2.01. Judge Learned Hand thus summed up the concept of identical original works:
[I]f by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keat's
Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an "author," and, if he copyrighted it, others
might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats's.... [this]
owner's protection is more limited, for just as he is no less an "author" because
others have preceded him, so another who follows him, is not a tort-feasor unless
he pirates his work.
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
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revised the writing still has the right to prepare a derivative
work.5 4 In the event that both authors desire to revise a scientific
work, it is suggested that the revisions will, by necessity, resemble
each other since they will both reflect the latest advances in the
field.
If Dr. Freeman had desired to revise the preexisting work after
Dr. Weissmann had already done so, it is likely that his revision
("P-2") would be very similar to P-i1. 5 Dr. Freeman would natu-
rally want to include his report on "false positive" studies in his
revision, as Dr. Weissmann had done, and this inclusion would
cause P-2 to resemble P-1. While Dr. Weissmann would have the
burden of proving Dr. Freeman copied P-1 in order to prevail on
an infringement claim, 5 7 she would be able to do so with circum-
stantial evidence that Dr. Freeman had access to P-1 while he was
writing P-2 and that P-2 was substantially similar to P-1.5 8
However, it is submitted that if the substantial standard of
originality had been applied, Dr. Weissmann would have been
669 (1936) (citations omitted).
"' See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982); see also Weinstein v. University of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091,
1095 (7th Cir. 1987) (each owner of copyright may revise work).
5 It is asserted that the fact that IDA research had run its course would preclude any
dramatic discoveries in a revised work. Nevertheless, since Dr. Weissmann was permitted to
copyright a minimally original revision, Dr. Freeman might be liable for copyright infringe-
ment if he were to present the same minor news in the same way.
11 See Weissmann, 684 F. Supp. at 1256. It is submitted that in order to avoid a possi-
ble copyright infringement suit, Dr. Freeman might be put in the embarrassing position of
having to omit his own article from P-2.
'1 See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1321
(E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987);
Merritt Forbes, 604 F. Supp. at 138; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp.
125, 138 (D.N.J. 1982), aff'd, 775 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986);
Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 451, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 360 F.2d 928 (2d
Cir. 1966).
58 See, e.g., Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1982)
(copying may be established by showing access and substantial similarity); Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977) (cop-
ying may be shown by circumstantial evidence of access and similarity); Novelty Textile
Mills v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff may prove copying
by showing access to original); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (trier of
fact may infer copying from access to original); R. Dakin & Co. v. Charles Offset Co., 441 F.
Supp. 434, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (plaintiff makes prima facie case by showing access and
similarity); see also Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch. Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 64
(3d Cir.) (plaintiff may prove copying by circumstantial evidence if direct evidence is lack-
ing), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); Klitzner Indus., Inc. v. H.K. James & Co., 535 F.
Supp. 1249, 1254 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (plaintiff need not introduce direct evidence of copying
but may prove case circumstantially).
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compelled to show that P-1 was significantly different from the
preexisting work before becoming entitled to copyright protection.
Under this standard, it is unlikely that a "P-2" would accidentally
resemble a "P-i," whereas such resemblance could easily arise
where only "more than trivial" originality is necessary to copyright
"P-i. '59 It is submitted that had the Weissmann court applied the
test of substantial originality, Dr. Weissmann would have retained
the freedom to prepare her derivative work, while Dr. Freeman's
right to prepare his own derivative would have also been protected
without placing him at a disadvantage in any ensuing litigation. 0
CONCLUSION
Each joint author's right to prepare a derivative work based
on the underlying work must be protected, and coauthors should
not be forced into an unwanted permanent partnership. Since the
intent of a coauthor is dispositive in determining whether a new
work is a derivative, and thus copyrightable, evidence as to that
coauthor's credibility should be examined. The substantial degree
of originality test for copyrightability would protect a coauthor's
interest in a true derivative work without prejudicing any legiti-
mate claim that the work was actually written pursuant to an
agreement that future revisions would be joint works. Further-
" Cf. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983). Judge Posner, writ-
ing for the Gracen court, stated "the purpose of the term [original] in copyright law is not
to guide aesthetic judgments but to assure a sufficiently gross difference between the under-
lying and the derivative work to avoid entangling subsequent artists depicting the underly-
ing work in copyright problems." Id. It is suggested that a higher standard of originality will
facilitate the difficult factual determinations necessary in derivative suits, especially those
with facts similar to the case at bar. Cf. Hazen, Contract Principles as a Guide for Protect-
ing Intellectual Property Rights in Computer Software: The Limits of Copyright Protec-
tion, the Evolving Concept of Derivative Works, and the Proper Limits of Licensing Ar-
rangements, 20 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 105, 117 (1986) (broad definition of derivative work
precludes bright-line test and makes each determination highly factual).
'0 Cf. Gracen, 698 F.2d at 305. The Gracen court stated:
The requirement of originality is significant chiefly in connection with derivative
works, where if interpreted too liberally it would paradoxically inhibit rather than
promote the creation of such works by giving the first creator a considerable
power to interfere with the creation of subsequent derivative works from the same
underlying work.
Id. Under the Gracen rationale, a requirement of substantial originality would allow authors
of derivative works to copyright them, while also allowing other authors to create derivative
works based on the underlying work. Id.
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more, the higher level of originality necessary will facilitate the
court's task of making factual determinations in such cases.
Brian Murray
